On 10 September, Australia published three Bills. From 1 January 2028, no one will export LNG from Australia without a licence, and every licence will carry a quantity of gas the holder must sell at home — set each year by a regulator and adjustable by a minister.
The policy is branded a 20 per cent reservation. Applied to Australia’s own legislation and its own regulator’s forecasts, it reserves about seven cargoes in its first year.
The gap between the headline and the mechanism is worth knowing. The reason to read on is narrower: Australia had to legislate for a power Canada already holds, and has never used.
In 60 seconds
- The 20% is a ceiling, not a quota. The binding number is a “demand calibrated quantity” the regulator sets each June. The explanatory memorandum is explicit: it “cannot be more than the 20 per cent”.
- Our model says seven cargoes in 2028. Above what the Gladstone ventures already sell domestically, the scheme diverts about 26 PJ in its first year — 0.6% of Australian LNG exports. By 2030 it reaches 33 cargoes, or 2.9%.
- It hardens because Bass Strait is emptying. The obligation rises 60% between 2028 and 2030 while the scheme itself does not change. Southern production falls 46%.
- Western Australia is the control group. It reserved 15% in 2006, never intervened again, and its exporters already plan more domestic gas in 2028 than the new federal formula requires.
- The government is describing its own Bill incorrectly. Its explainers say 110% of forecast demand. Section 24(5) says 110% of demand less non-exporter supply. In 2028 the difference is 27 cargoes.
- An Australian exporter is buying Canadian LNG. Six days after its CEO said every cargo Canada locks in is one Australia foregoes, Santos signed for 1 mtpa from Ksi Lisims. Its stated reasons are purely commercial — but under the drafting, holding international supply may make relief from the domestic obligation harder to obtain.
- Bottom line: the volume is noise. The instrument is not. Every North Asian long-term contract signed in 2026 went to Qatar, the United States or Malaysia — none to Australia.
What Was Actually Legislated
Three Bills went out on 10 September and consultation closed a fortnight later. They repeal the Australian Domestic Gas Security Mechanism and the domestic price cap, and replace both with something more durable: a licence. Verified
Licences run 20 to 50 years and cannot be transferred. The obligation attaches not to the project but to “the person who holds legal title to the liquefied natural gas immediately before” loading — the lifter, which in Australian LNG usually means a foreign equity partner. Missing the obligation carries a maximum penalty of $910 million. Verified
The 20 per cent everyone quotes is section 17. But section 24 overrides it whenever a smaller number applies. Each June the Australian Energy Regulator sets a “demand calibrated quantity” for every licence holder, and where that is lower it becomes the obligation. The explanatory memorandum leaves no doubt: the calibrated amount “cannot be more than the 20 per cent DSO”. Verified
So the real question is how the regulator will calibrate. Section 24(5) says the target is forecast domestic demand, less forecast supply from everyone who is not a licence holder, plus 10 per cent of that residual. The minister may reduce the 10 per cent to zero. Verified
The government’s own explainer, its roundtable slides and its ministers all describe this as “110% of forecast demand”. That is a different calculation, and a much larger one. The Bill governs. Interpretation
Seven Cargoes
Run the formula and the first regulated period produces an obligation of about 169 PJ. The three Gladstone ventures already sell roughly 143 PJ a year into the domestic market on contract. The incremental gas — the gas that would not otherwise have stayed home — is about 26 PJ. Estimate
That is seven cargoes, against Australian exports of roughly 1,127 cargo-equivalents a year. Six-tenths of one per cent. Estimate
Even the gross obligation — counting gas the ventures already sell at home — peaks at 6.3 per cent of exports, under every assumption we tested. Estimate
The government’s own claim is “up to 200 additional petajoules” a year, and it justifies the scheme against “AEMO forecast possible shortfalls of up to 140 petajoules”. Verified The 140 PJ appears nowhere in AEMO’s central case; it belongs to the Accelerated Transition scenario, in 2034 and 2036. In the central Step Change case the largest gap anywhere in the series is 106 PJ, in 2035 — and in 2028, the first year the obligation bites, the forecast gap is zero. Verified
The fair answer to that: AEMO puts the probability of an annual supply gap at 59 per cent by 2030 and 100 per cent from 2033, and the ACCC expects structural shortfalls from 2030. A scheme that takes three years to stand up has to be legislated before the problem arrives. The timing is defensible. The sizing rhetoric is not. Interpretation
It Hardens Because Bass Strait Is Emptying
The obligation rises about 60 per cent between 2028 and 2030. Nothing in the scheme changes. What changes is the denominator.
AEMO forecasts southern production falling from 318 PJ to 170 PJ by 2030, a 46 per cent decline driven by the depleting Gippsland fields. Demand barely moves. The residual the formula acts on widens by more than 100 PJ without a single policy decision. Verified
By 2030 the calibrated quantity finally exceeds the 20 per cent ceiling, and the ceiling starts to bind. The bite of Australia’s reservation scheme is set by the decline rate of Bass Strait. Interpretation
Western Australia Already Did This, Twenty Years Ago
There is a natural experiment inside Australia, and it is the part of this story most useful to anyone still building export capacity.
Western Australia reserved 15 per cent of LNG production for the domestic market in 2006, wrote it into each State Agreement before the plants were built, and priced it in. It has not had to intervene since. A 2024 parliamentary review left the offshore policy unchanged. Verified
The east coast did the opposite. It connected its domestic market to export parity at Gladstone with no reservation at all, and has spent the nine years since escalating.
The lesson is not that reservation works or fails. It is that early clarity cost less than late intervention — and that a jurisdiction which sets the terms before the capital is committed does not end up writing licence regimes afterwards. British Columbia is at the point on that curve where Western Australia stood in 2006. Interpretation
The Cost Is Not the Volume
If the scheme diverts seven cargoes, why is the reaction so loud?
Because the volume is not what changed. What changed is that a sovereign now sets an annual number, with ministerial discretion over it, on an asset class financed on twenty-year certainty. Wood Mackenzie, modelling for the Australian industry, put it precisely: “Discretion of this breadth is a cost independent of how it is exercised, because parameters set by annual judgment rather than transparent rules cannot be modelled with confidence and are priced as a risk premium.” Verified
Three features sharpen it. Relief for pre-existing contracts must be requested in the original licence application and determined by 31 December 2027 — before a single regulated period has run and before the regulator’s calibration method exists. Buying third-party gas to comply is penalised rather than rewarded: acquiring gas that is not certified “additional” increases your own obligation by the same amount. And the method for splitting the aggregate between exporters is in neither Bill. Verified
“The proposed scheme may have a retrospective effect by effectively replacing an existing contractual right to export with a requirement to obtain regulatory approval to continue exporting.” — Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, submission to the Australian Government, 30 June 2026
That submission matters more than any analyst note. The IEEJ’s members are Japan’s major energy suppliers and industrial consumers, and Australian LNG is about 40 per cent of Japan’s LNG imports and 10 per cent of its primary energy supply. Its language is not diplomatic: the must-sell obligation “may be perceived as inconsistent with fundamental principles of a market economy”, and the scheme “is likely to discourage additional upstream investment in Australia”. Verified
The response is already visible in the contracting register. Every North Asian long-term SPA we could verify in 2026 was signed with Qatar, the United States or Malaysia. None with an Australian project. Verified
All of this is landing in the tightest Pacific market in years. Qatar shipped 18 cargoes in the six months after the Strait of Hormuz closed, against 509 in the same period a year earlier; two Ras Laffan trains, 17 per cent of Qatari capacity, are damaged with a three-year repair. The IEA now expects global LNG supply broadly flat in 2026, having forecast 7 per cent growth two quarters earlier. Australia, meanwhile, ran at 97.2 per cent of nameplate in August. Verified It is the most reliable large supplier left in the basin, and it has just written itself an option to keep gas at home. Interpretation
Six Days in September
On 9 September, Kevin Gallagher told the National Press Club that Canada was “stepping into the LNG supply gap Australia has allowed to emerge”, and that “every LNG cargo Canada locks in for the future, is a cargo Australia foregoes”. Verified
The exposure draft Bills landed the next day. Five days after that, on 15 September, Santos announced a non-binding heads of agreement with Western LNG to buy about 1 mtpa of Canadian LNG from the Ksi Lisims project, free on board, for up to twenty years from around 2031. Verified
Santos gives four reasons, all commercial: grow LNG sales “without a corresponding increase in upstream capital investment”; supply flexibility for Asian customers; geographic diversification into Canadian LNG with “a secure, relatively short shipping route to premium north Asian markets”; and portfolio optimisation. The release does not mention Australian policy, the reservation scheme, GLNG or the Australian domestic market. Verified Take that at face value — and note that the pattern is older than the policy. Woodside contracted 2.5 mtpa from Commonwealth LNG in Louisiana in September 2022, and took FID on the 16.5 mtpa first phase of its own Louisiana LNG in April 2025. Verified
What is new is the coast. Santos’s is the first Pacific-facing North American position taken by an Australian exporter, and it lands in the same fortnight as the Bills. Interpretation
One piece of drafting is then worth reading closely. Relief from the domestic obligation on the grounds of a pre-existing export contract requires three cumulative tests, and the second is that the licence holder cannot reasonably produce or acquire additional gas. Four days before the Santos announcement, King & Wood Mallesons published its reading: “if the licence holder could ‘reasonably’ purchase gas (including from international sources) … the second limb would not be satisfied.” Verified
An international supply portfolio is, on that reading, evidence that relief is not needed.
That bites hardest on the ventures which are already net buyers. In 2025 the Queensland exporters sold 181 PJ into the domestic market and bought 228 PJ out of it, from producers other than themselves. Verified Two of the three carry a net domestic purchase requirement on the ACCC’s forward numbers. Verified
The Canadian gas itself cannot help. An obligation is discharged only by physically supplying gas into the Australian market, and only from the holder’s own gas or gas certified as “additional”. A Canadian cargo would have to be shipped to Australia and regasified — and Australia has exactly one import terminal, at Port Kembla, whose owner argued in the Financial Review on 23 September that the availability of regasification should stop pipeline constraints being “an automatic reason to reduce domestic supply obligations”. Verified
So the world’s third-largest LNG exporter has written an obligation that is easier to discharge if you can import LNG, and harder to escape if you can buy it. No one involved has said that is the intention. But it is the machinery they have built. Interpretation
The Same Lever, Closer to Home
Australia is not inventing a power. It is the only one of the three major Western exporters that had to legislate for one.
The United States has the weakest hand of the three. Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act creates a rebuttable presumption in favour of export; exports to free-trade partners are deemed consistent with the public interest and granted “without modification or delay”. The Department of Energy has vacated nine long-term authorisations and never once over the holder’s objection, and its 2018 policy statement says it “does not foresee a scenario” in which it would. The January 2024 pause touched only pending applications, never a flowing molecule, and was enjoined within six months. Congress repealed the general domestic-use authority in 2015 — which is why the bill introduced in the Senate last December has to re-enact it. Verified
Canada is the other end of the scale. Under the Canadian Energy Regulator Act the Commission “must not issue a licence unless it is satisfied that the quantity of oil or gas to be exported does not exceed the surplus remaining after allowance has been made for the reasonably foreseeable requirements for use in Canada”. Unlike the American test, the applicant carries the burden. Verified
It goes further than that. The Commission may vary a licence on its own initiative and attach any conditions it considers appropriate (s348). It may suspend or revoke a licence if it considers that to be in the public interest (s351). And the Governor in Council may make regulations prescribing “the price at which or the range of prices within which” exported gas must be sold — and may set different prices for different countries (s353). Verified
Ottawa can do by regulation what Canberra spent eighteen months legislating, and more. It never has. Of 58 export and import licence applications to January 2023, 47 were approved and none was refused. Every revocation on record came at the licence holder’s own request. Verified
The reason is straightforward: Canada has never had Australia’s problem. It produced 8,249 PJ of marketable gas in 2025 against 5,302 PJ of domestic demand, and LNG was 1.5 per cent of production. AECO sits structurally below Henry Hub. There is no domestic price grievance to answer, and we found no federal, provincial or party proposal for reservation since LNG Canada started up — the debate runs entirely the other way. Verified
One qualification, and it is the one a Canadian reader should hold onto: Ontario and Quebec import just under half their gas from the United States, and most western Canadian gas reaching them transits US territory. “Canada is long gas” is a national truth with a regional exception, and regional exceptions are how these fights start. Interpretation
The honest objection
The strongest argument against the whole scheme sits in the ACCC’s own data. In the second half of 2025, under the Heads of Agreement, the LNG producers offered 85.9 PJ to domestic buyers and sold 9.2 PJ — while exporting 41.5 PJ as eleven spot cargoes. Verified The gas was offered. Buyers did not take it at those terms. That is a price problem, and a must-sell obligation into a deliberately oversupplied market treats the symptom. Australian Energy Producers, whose members would carry the obligation, size the calibration at “around 50 PJ” and argue producers “should not be forced to sell gas below cost”. Against all that: the three Gladstone ventures control about 84 per cent of east coast proved and probable reserves, and southern supply is collapsing. A market that concentrated does not obviously self-correct. Both halves are true.
What would prove this wrong
- The regulator’s calibration method, when it appears in 2027, allocates on a basis that produces materially more than ~170 PJ in 2028 — our reading of s24(5) would be wrong.
- Parliament amends s24(5) to match the government’s own explainers, lifting the first-year obligation by about 100 PJ.
- A North Asian buyer signs a new long-term Australian SPA on normal terms before the Bills pass — the sovereign-risk reading weakens considerably.
- Any Canadian or US federal reservation proposal emerges, which would move the lever from dormant to live and change this analysis entirely.
What This Means for You
| If you are | What the evidence says | The question to ask |
|---|---|---|
| A Canadian LNG developer or producer | Your export licence already contains a domestic-needs test and a ministerial approval. It has never bound, because Canada is long gas. | Have you read the conditions on your own licence, and do your offtakers know what s348 and s351 say? |
| A North American gas producer | The US lever is the weakest of the three and the politics have no legislative traction. Exports ran 17.4 Bcf/d in the first half, up 23%. | What would have to happen to Henry Hub before the public-interest test stopped being a formality? |
| A trader or portfolio player | The diverted volume is noise. The repricing of Australian supply risk is not, and it is already in the 2026 contracting register. | What discount are you applying to Australian term supply that you were not applying in 2025? |
| An Asian buyer | Relief for existing contracts must be applied for in the original licence application and determined by 31 December 2027. | Has your Australian counterparty told you what it intends to file, and when? |
| A BC or Alberta policymaker | Western Australia reserved before the plants were built and never intervened again. The east coast did not, and has intervened four times. | Is it cheaper to set the domestic terms now, or to legislate them in 2040? |
Signposts
| If | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| The Bills are amended so the 10% applies to demand, not the residual | The first-year obligation roughly doubles. Watch the drafting, not the press release. |
| The AER’s calibration instrument lands in 2027 with a per-exporter allocation rule | That is the number that matters. Nothing before it is more than an estimate, including ours. |
| A Japanese or Korean utility signs new Australian term supply | The sovereign-risk premium is smaller than the submissions suggest. |
| LNG Canada Phase 2 reaches FID | Reported as possible in early October. Fourteen more mtpa from a jurisdiction that has never pulled its lever. |
| Ontario or Quebec faces a winter supply squeeze | The one route by which a Canadian domestic-supply argument becomes real. |
Australia’s reservation scheme will not reshape the Pacific LNG balance. Seven cargoes will not be noticed in a market missing most of Qatar. What it does is establish, in a Western democracy with a mature export industry, that the right to export is a licence the state grants annually rather than a contract the state honours. Canada wrote itself that power seven years ago and has never used it. The interesting question is not whether Ottawa would. It is whether anyone buying Canadian LNG has read the statute.
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