Two strategic bets — made for different reasons, years apart — both vindicated by the same shock. A still-unfolding energy crisis that has turned Pacific-routed North American LPG from optionality into necessity.
Shubham Vashist·June 2026·12 min read All figures publicly sourced
3+ monthsduration as of this writing — not resolved
11.3M b/dMay shut-ins, EIA — rising, not falling
6.2M b/dextra US petroleum exports since March (EIA)
Nov 2025India's US LPG deal — signed before the crisis
In November 2025, India signed its first structured LPG supply contract with the United States — a trade-rebalancing decision aimed at tariff politics, not energy security. In February 2026, a Calgary-based midstream company's executive explained, in a published interview, why his company had spent fourteen years building Pacific export terminals around a single chokepoint risk. Within days, that risk materialised. Neither party predicted the war. Both had, for entirely different reasons, already positioned for it.
01 — Reading This ArticleHow the Evidence Is Labelled
This article covers an active, still-unfolding military and energy crisis. Given the stakes and the pace at which facts on the ground have changed, every material claim below is labelled by evidence tier:
VERIFIED — directly reported by Reuters, the EIA, or other primary sources, with the claim matching the source's own language. EIA ESTIMATE — a figure from the US Energy Information Administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook, which the EIA itself revises monthly as conditions change. These are the best available quantitative anchors for the crisis but are explicitly forecasts, not settled facts. INTERPRETATION — this publication's own analysis of what the verified facts and estimates mean commercially, clearly separated from the factual record.
02 — The Verified TimelineWhat Actually Happened, and What Remains Unresolved
February 28, 2026 VERIFIED
A joint US-Israeli military operation, subsequently named "Operation Epic Fury," strikes Iranian military targets. Iran's Supreme Leader is reported to have been killed in the operation.
Sources: contemporaneous reporting; White House communications (April 2026).
March 2, 2026 VERIFIED
Reuters reports an Iranian Revolutionary Guards official stating the Strait of Hormuz is closed, warning Iran would fire on any ship attempting to pass. Brent crude trades around $80/bbl.
Source: Reuters, March 2, 2026.
March 4, 2026 VERIFIED
QatarEnergy declares force majeure on LNG shipments following attacks on its facilities. Multiple sources report it could take at least a month to return to normal production. Independent analysis (UK House of Commons Library, citing WTO trade data) finds crude oil vessel transits through the Strait fell approximately 95% and LNG vessel transits fell approximately 99% in the days following.
Sources: Reuters, March 4, 2026; UK House of Commons Library briefing.
March 2026 VERIFIED
Saudi Aramco warns of "catastrophic consequences" for global oil markets if the disruption continues. The EIA's first crisis-adjusted outlook (released April 7) retrospectively estimates 7.5 million b/d of Gulf production was shut in during March, with Brent averaging $103/bbl for the month.
Sources: Reuters; EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, April 7, 2026.
March 19 – April 2026 VERIFIED
The United States launches a campaign aimed at reopening the Strait. A ceasefire is announced in early April but does not fully hold. Brent spikes to $138/bbl on April 7 — the crisis peak confirmed by EIA data — before easing somewhat. The EIA's April 7 outlook had forecast shut-ins rising to 9.1 million b/d; its subsequent May 12 outlook found actual April shut-ins were higher still, at 10.5 million b/d, with Brent averaging $117/bbl for the month.
Sources: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, April and May 2026 editions; market commentary.
April 13–18, 2026 VERIFIED
The United States imposes a naval blockade on Iran. Iran closes the Strait again on April 18, despite the earlier ceasefire announcement. The UAE departs OPEC effective May 1, 2026, a significant additional complication for the global supply picture.
Sources: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, May 2026; OPEC/EIA reporting on UAE departure.
May 2026 EIA ESTIMATE
EIA's May 12 outlook assumes the Strait remains effectively closed through late May, with traffic gradually resuming in June, but does not expect regional production to return to pre-conflict levels for the remainder of 2026. Shut-ins are estimated to have risen further to 11.3 million b/d in May — the highest figure of the crisis to date.
Sources: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, May and June 2026 editions.
June 2026 — As of this writing EIA ESTIMATE
The EIA's most recent outlook states the disruption "has now surpassed three months" and remains active. The agency now assumes Strait traffic will not meaningfully resume until 3Q26, with pre-conflict trade patterns not expected to return until early 2027. This is an ongoing, unresolved situation, not a closed historical episode.
Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, June 2026 edition.
A Note on What This Article Does Not Claim
This article does not assert exact vessel-by-vessel casualty figures, does not claim the conflict has resolved, and does not present EIA forecasts as certainties — the EIA itself has revised its own assumptions upward in every successive monthly outlook since the crisis began, a pattern worth noting in its own right. Where this article cites a number, it cites the specific source and the date that number was reported or estimated.
03 — The Price and Supply ShockWhat the EIA's Own Numbers Show
EIA Estimated Gulf Production Shut-Ins — Escalating Each Month EIA ESTIMATE
Million barrels per day, Iraq/Saudi Arabia/Kuwait/UAE/Qatar/Bahrain combined · From EIA's own monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook revisions
Source: US Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, April, May, and June 2026 editions. Each successive monthly outlook revised the prior month's estimate upward as actual conditions proved worse than the EIA's own assumptions — the EIA's April 7 outlook assumed the conflict would not persist past April; it did. Star (★) denotes most recent confirmed figure as of this writing. These are EIA estimates, not directly observed production data, and are subject to further revision.
USD/barrel · Monthly averages and confirmed peak, per EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook editions
Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, April–June 2026 editions. Pre-crisis baseline ~$63 (late Feb 2026, market commentary); March average $103 and April 7 peak $138 confirmed by EIA; April average $117 confirmed (May 12 outlook); May–June forecast ~$106, falling to $89 by 4Q26 per EIA's June outlook, itself explicitly conditional on Strait traffic resuming in 3Q26. Annual 2026 average forecast: $95/bbl. All forward figures are EIA forecasts, not settled outcomes, and have been revised in every successive monthly release.
04 — Two Strategic BetsAltaGas (2012) and India (November 2025) — Independent, Unrelated, Both Vindicated
The AltaGas Bet — Built for the Risk, Not the War
VERIFIED In a Globe and Mail feature published February 24, 2026 — four days before the crisis began — an AltaGas executive explained the founding logic of the company's Prince Rupert propane export terminals: "Japan was looking to diversify its supply of propane... The Asian country had previously relied on the Middle East for propane but shipments had to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a choke point that could be shut by Iranian military action." That assessment dates to 2012. RIPET opened in 2019 and has grown from an initial 46,000 b/d to a confirmed 92,000 b/d today. REEF, the adjacent expansion, was already under construction with end-2026 completion targeted before any of the current crisis began.
INTERPRETATION The accurate way to characterise this is not that AltaGas "predicted" the 2026 war — no one predicts the specific timing of a military conflict. The accurate characterisation is that AltaGas correctly identified, fourteen years in advance, that Hormuz represented a structural chokepoint risk material enough to justify building several billion dollars of alternative export infrastructure around it. The strategic logic was validated by the crisis, whether or not the specific scenario was foreseen in its exact form.
India's Bet — Signed for Trade Politics, Three Months Before the War
VERIFIED India signed its first structured one-year LPG supply agreement with the United States on November 17, 2025 — three months before the Hormuz crisis began. Multiple contemporaneous reports frame this deal explicitly as trade-rebalancing: addressing India's roughly $40 billion trade surplus with the US amid tariff tensions, not as an energy security measure. The deal involves named US suppliers (Chevron, Phillips 66, TotalEnergies Trading) and Indian buyers (Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum), covering approximately 2.2 million tonnes, with up to 48 VLGC charters planned for 2026, priced off the Mont Belvieu benchmark.
INTERPRETATION This is the most important correction to how this story should be told. India's pivot toward US LPG was not a reaction to the Hormuz crisis — it predates it by three months and was driven by entirely different political and commercial considerations. What the crisis did was transform a trade-politics decision into one that looked, within weeks, remarkably prescient on energy security grounds as well. This is a genuinely striking parallel to AltaGas: two organisations, on two continents, making structural diversification decisions for unconnected reasons, both vindicated by the same unforeseen shock.
Neither AltaGas nor India's government had a crystal ball. Both had a clear-eyed read of why diversification away from a single chokepoint or a single trade relationship carries value — independent of when, or whether, the specific risk ever materialises.
05 — Asia's ExposureWhy the Impact Was Not Uniform VERIFIED WHERE CITED
The Strait of Hormuz carries a disproportionate share of Asia's energy imports, but the exposure — and the flexibility to respond — varies significantly by country.
India — High Exposure, High Flexibility
~52%
S&P Global Platts estimated approximately 52% of India's crude imports normally transit Hormuz (cited March 3, 2026). India's oil minister stated non-Hormuz crude sourcing had risen to roughly 70% of imports by mid-March as the country actively diversified (Reuters, March 12). LPG storage of approximately 1.2 million tonnes covers roughly 15 days of national demand (~80,000–90,000 tonnes/day) — a real but thin buffer.
Japan — Severe Crude Exposure
~93%
Japan imports roughly 93% of its crude through routes transiting Hormuz overall, among the highest dependency ratios of any major economy. Tokyo requested a domestic strategic reserve release in response to the crisis.
South Korea — Comparable to Japan
~68%
South Korea channels an estimated 68% of crude imports through Hormuz — a dependency on par with Japan's, and a market this series has tracked closely for its Canadian-origin propane import share.
China — Lower Relative, High Absolute
~40%
China sends an estimated 40% of crude imports through Hormuz — proportionally lower than Japan or Korea, but in absolute terms the largest volume of any single buyer globally. China reportedly tapped domestic fertiliser reserves in response to broader supply disruption.
Pakistan and Bangladesh — Limited Options
Qatar and the UAE together supply the large majority of Pakistan's and Bangladesh's LNG imports. Neither country has India's scale of storage, diplomatic leverage with Iran, or capital to rapidly contract alternative long-term supply — illustrating the far end of the exposure spectrum during this crisis.
06 — The Macro EvidenceWhat the EIA's Own Trade Data Shows About the North American Pivot
EIA ESTIMATE The single clearest piece of evidence that North American supply absorbed meaningful displaced demand comes directly from the EIA's June 2026 outlook: "Since March, we estimate the United States has exported an average of 6.2 million barrels per day more petroleum products — not including crude oil — than it has [historically]." This is an aggregate, all-destination figure — it does not isolate LPG specifically, and it does not isolate Asia specifically — but it is the most authoritative, macro-level confirmation available that global buyers turned to US supply at scale during the crisis window.
US Petroleum Product Exports — Crisis-Period Increase EIA ESTIMATE
Million b/d above historical baseline, all petroleum products excluding crude oil, since March 2026
Source: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook, June 2026 edition. Figure covers all petroleum products excluding crude oil, all export destinations — not LPG-specific or Asia-specific. Presented as the best available macro-level evidence that global buyers shifted toward US-origin supply during the crisis; the magnitude of the Canada-specific or LPG-specific contribution within this total is not separately disclosed by the EIA and would require further granular trade data to isolate.
07 — Where Things StandAn Unresolved Crisis, a Strengthening Case
As of this writing, the Strait of Hormuz has not returned to normal commercial function. The EIA's own June 2026 outlook does not expect meaningful traffic resumption before the third quarter of 2026, and does not expect pre-conflict trade patterns to fully return until early 2027. This is not a closed historical episode to analyse in hindsight — it is a live, evolving situation, and any reader should treat the specific figures in this article as a snapshot as of mid-June 2026, subject to revision as the EIA and other sources update their assessments.
What is defensible, based on the verified record assembled here, is this: a real and still-ongoing energy security shock has materially reinforced the strategic logic behind two independent diversification decisions — one made in 2012 by a Calgary midstream company, one made in November 2025 by the Indian government — neither of which were responses to this specific war, both of which now look prescient because of it. For North American LPG and LNG exporters, and for the Asian buyers increasingly diversifying toward them, the practical lesson is not that any specific volume of demand has been captured. It is that the value of supply chain optionality has been demonstrated in the most visible and costly way possible, with the bill for not having it still being paid by economies most exposed to a single, contested chokepoint.
LNG contract economics, LPG benchmarks and Pacific trade flows, VLGC freight, China PDH and NGL export infrastructure. Independent market intelligence, built only on sources you can check.